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The doctrine of adverse possession, as most people know, operates to extinguish the owner’s 
title to land once a squatter has been in adverse possession of it for 12 years, and allows the 
adverse possessor or squatter to become the owner of that land.  The doctrine still operates in 
this manner in Ireland and in relation to unregistered land in England. However, the English 
Land Registration Act 2002 dramatically reformed the doctrine in relation to registered land 
conferring the registered owner with the power to veto most adverse possession claims.    
 
This paper does two things. First, it examines how sympathy or antipathy for the owner 
emerges as a theme in the academic literature which discusses the law on adverse possession. 
The second aim of this paper is to discuss whether sympathy for the plight of the owner has 
already, or could be used in the future, influence whether the courts apply the rule in Leigh v 
Jack.
2
  
 
The blameworthiness of the owner as portrayed by the literature  
  
Two caricatures of the landowner occasionally emerge from adverse possession literature: 
One portrays him as the innocent victim of an unjust law which fails to adequately protect his 
interests; in the other he presents as the villain of the piece, guilty of neglecting the care or 
oversight of the land, a character who gets his just deserts in losing title to the land.   
 
The idea that the owner is blameworthy is based on a traditional rationale which has been 
advanced for the doctrine of adverse possession known as the ‘sleeping theory’.  It is argued 
that the doctrine of adverse possession is justified on the basis that it prevents a plaintiff from 
sleeping on his rights. Stake sums it up by saying ‘you snooze, you lose’3. At the extreme end 
of the spectrum of sleeping plaintiffs, is the owner who fails to act as he has abandoned the 
land.  Closer to the other end of the spectrum is the sleeping plaintiff who fails to detect the 
adverse possession due to a failure to monitor the land; it has been suggested that this owner 
could be described as a ‘bad land steward’.  
 
A very closely related rationale for the doctrine of adverse possession is the ‘earner’ theory, 
which justifies it on the basis that it punishes the owner who fails to use the land or develop it 
and rewards the squatter for doing so and also for bringing it back onto the market once he 
has acquired title. As we shall see, the moral and economic dimensions to these justifications 
tend to be linked. There is no shortage of American academic articles which critique the 
sleeping and earner theories and many of the authors reach a broadly similar conclusion that 
they do not, on their own, adequately justify the doctrine.
4
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 Merrill, Fennell and Stake view this social policy of punishing a ‘sleeping owner’ and 
rewarding a ‘working possessor’ as ‘dubious’ or a ‘straw man argument worthy of ridicule.’ 
The rationale ignores the prerogative of a property owner to do whatever he wants with his 
property, so long as he does not injure others.  They also point out that a passive use may be 
the best use. Stake notes that productive use may be undesirable from an environmental 
perspective and refers to the critical literature on this issue. Merrill argues that even land 
speculation may be the best use. The authors also point out that these rationales overstate 
what is required of the owner to avoid losing the land through adverse possession: he does 
not have to develop his land or even occupy it; all he has to do periodically is assert his right 
to exclude others.  As Stake notes, the owner ‘can avoid loss of title merely by monitoring… 
The incentive to use the land thus withers into an incentive to inspect for possessor every few 
years.’  
 
The authors point out that this requirement for absentee owners to monitor their lands may 
‘flush out offers to purchase’ which reduces the sleeping theory to a rationale designed to 
facilitate land transactions. Stake, qualifies this benefit by noting that very few buyers will 
want to camp out on the land in hopes of meeting the owner. He concludes, ‘the slightly 
greater chances for buyers to find sellers of land is not enough to dislodge the conclusion that 
increased monitoring is a cost rather than a benefit of adverse possession.’ 
 
The English literature on the sleeping theory was, until recently, less extensive. Dockray in 
his seminal article
5
 devotes a paragraph to it pointing out that it fails to provide a 
comprehensive explanation of the policy of the Limitation Act as it can only encourage an 
owner to protect himself if that owner knows or possibly if he ought to know that time has 
begun to run against him. But actual or constructive knowledge of the accrual of a cause of 
action is not a precondition for the operation of the Statute.  Bogusz in her legislative note on 
the 2002 Act
6
 comments that adverse possession may have had a role to play in feudal times 
when there was a need for some form of land redistribution as feudal landowners could no 
longer manage the estates they owned.  
 
This point inadvertently touches on the vital role which the doctrine of adverse possession 
continues to play in underdeveloped countries.  The importance of the doctrine in this context 
seems to be due to a combination of factors – inadequate land titling systems, vast areas of 
under-utilised land, and a shortage of housing.  Gardiner, in his article,
7
  encourages the more 
liberal application of adverse possession laws in less developed countries to counteract their 
inefficient property allocation systems.  
 
England, like many countries, suffers from a social housing shortage, an injustice which is 
compounded by the number of empty, unused and forgotten properties owned by local 
authorities. Two recent articles by Fox-O’Mahony and Cobb8 are extremely critical of large 
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landowners in England, particularly local authorities, who fail to monitor their properties. In 
their first article they accuse the Law Commission of ‘moral essentialism’ in its treatment of 
owners in formulating the proposals for the reforms which were introduced by the Land 
Registration Act 2002. The central focus of this first article by Fox and Cobb is the matter of 
forgotten properties. Fox and Cobb note: 
 
For the Law Commission, the problem of forgotten properties was one for which 
landowners were regarded as blameless… The clear (and contentious) moral 
implication here – that landowners cannot rather than simply do not supervise their 
properties effectively – reinforces the view that they should not be punished for 
inadequate supervision by losing title to their land. The LRA 2002 was specifically 
designed to protect registered proprietors from the possibility of such oversight or 
inadvertence.
9
  
 
Fox and Cobb note that the Law Commission focus is on large landowners and assumes that 
all examples of oversight were not the fault of landowners, but rather an unavoidable 
consequence of the ownership of huge volumes of land spread across large areas. They state, 
‘it is arguable that many large landowners are in a better position financially to manage their 
property effectively and should therefore be expected to take much greater responsibility for 
surveillance.’ They also note, ‘…the challenges of effective supervision seem less acute for 
landowners of smaller tracts of land.  One of their main arguments
10
 is that landowners who 
fail to monitor their land are in breach of their duty of stewardship and therefore have a 
morally weaker claim to the property than an urban squatter who occupies it as a home.  They 
state that this duty of stewardship should include a fundamental obligation to engage in an 
appropriate degree of supervision over empty land.  
 
In their second article, Fox-O’Mahony and Cobb discuss the Human Rights litigation in the 
Pye case, in which the Grand Chamber ruled that the old law on adverse possession did not 
infringe the right to property of the owner of the land. Much of their critique of the Grand 
Chamber’s decision is utterly convincing. However, they conclude with a claim, which builds 
on the point they made in their earlier article, that the interference with the right to property 
which took place under the old regime of adverse possession could be justified by the public 
interest it serves in promoting owners to act as good land stewards.  
 
It is true that a stewardship model of land ownership has replaced the more traditional liberal 
conception of ownership.
11
 This model generally restricts the owner’s rights of use and 
exclusion to comply with his community orientated responsibilities and forms a solid basis 
for regulation designed to protect the environment or heritage or to confer public rights of 
access to the countryside.
12
  I find it difficult to use this ideology to justify the complete 
extinguishment of title which takes place under the old regime of adverse possession, 
especially when a duty to monitor the land does not impose an obligation to care for it. In my 
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view, the doctrine does not represent a proportionate response in this regard. Even when the 
law does intervene to promote the maintenance of land or buildings in the public interest, for 
example under the Irish Derelict Sites Act 1990, warning notices and fines are generally 
relied on. The compulsory acquisition of title is seen as the last resort when all other attempts 
to encourage the landowner to comply with his obligations have failed.
 
This gentler or more 
nuanced approach to promoting the oversight of land in fact mirrors the early warning system 
of adverse possession introduced by the 2002.  
 
Although the Law Commission may have been guided by intuition rather than an analysis of 
the literature in making its proposals, much of this literature in fact rejects the sleeping theory 
or the need to monitor land as an adequate justification for the doctrine. Perhaps the Law 
Commission was overly influenced by the problems faced by local authorities in dealing with 
adverse possessors and it is also true that they could have made a better attempt to view the 
moral quandaries presented by the situation of the urban squatter more holistically. Fox and 
Cobb do an excellent job of re-balancing the case for reform by presenting the benefits of the 
old law from a moral perspective which highlights the difficulties faced by urban squatters 
and the blameworthiness of local authorities in failing to keep track of their properties.  I 
would argue however, that these authors may also be guilty of a degree of moral essentialism 
in their analysis of the blameworthiness of the owner. However, it is difficult to see how 
subjective biases can be avoided in assessing whether a law is unfair especially when you 
examine how it operates in specific situations. In reality most landowners lose title through 
adverse possession to their neighbours or members of their family. Such landowners often 
wish to avoid conflict and assume that the occupier recognises that their presence is simply 
tolerated by the owner. Does this failure to formalise the arrangement or commence litigation  
due to a desire to avoid antagonising neighbours or family really make the owner a bad land 
steward? The failure to act becomes even more understandable if the owner has no current 
use for the property but has future plans for it. Fox-O’Mahony and Cobb make their argument 
in relation to the owner’s duty of stewardship against the backdrop of the Pye litigation which 
draws particular attention to the position of this type of owner and yet they fail to really 
address the blameworthiness of Pye. 
 
Leigh v Jack – Has it been applied out of sympathy for the owner?  
 
Whether the doctrine should operate in these circumstances in favour of the squatter who is 
currently making use of the land has presented difficulties for the courts for many years, ever 
since Bramwell LJ set out the rule in Leigh v Jack in a Court of Appeal decision bearing that 
name. This rule states that time cannot run in favour of the squatter unless he is engaged in 
acts of user which are inconsistent with the future plans of the owner. The dilemma for 
subsequent courts was that there were a number of reasons for the decision in Leigh v Jack 
and therefore the case was often cited to support other fundamental elements of the doctrine. 
Whether the rule in Leigh v Jack
13
 should be applied has confounded the courts for many 
years although, to date, the judiciary has, for the most part, decided the issue as a matter of 
black letter law, or at least with no express references to the blameworthiness of the owner.   
 
The judgment of Nicholas Strauss QC in Beaulane Properties Ltd v Palmer
14
 represents the 
only attempt by the judiciary to apply the rule in Leigh v Jack to ensure that the owner’s 
rights were adequately protected. He was satisfied that the law in relation to registered land, 
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as it applied before the 2002 Act,
15
 infringed the right to property of the true owner protected 
by the European Convention on Human Rights. He referred to section 3 of the Human Rights 
Act 1998, which provides that legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is 
compatible with Convention rights. He held that this required him to apply the rule in Leigh v 
Jack which meant that the owner did not lose title through adverse possession.
16
 This 
approach is now only of historic value given the Grand Chamber ruling in Pye that the law in 
question was compatible with the Convention.
17
  
 
In Ireland, although the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue, the High Court has, for 
the most part, leaned against the adoption of the rule in Leigh v Jack.
18
 It is interesting to note 
that in the only Irish High Court case to rule in favour of the owner solely on the basis of the 
rule in Leigh v Jack (Cork Corporation v Lynch
19
), the court criticised the Corporation’s 
delay in bringing proceedings and refused an order for costs.  To sum up, sympathy for the 
owner does not seem to have overtly shaped the law in this area.   
Was the owner in Pye blameworthy?  
 
The European Court of Human Rights did refer to the culpability of the company in failing to 
regularise the Grahams’ occupation of the land or issue proceedings within the 12-year 
limitation period, particularly given that it was engaged in specialised professional real-estate 
development and should be assumed to have knowledge of the law on adverse possession.  
 
However, in my opinion, the culpability of the company was not so clear cut.  There was a 
history of grazing agreements and it would clearly have been in the financial interests of the 
company to enter into another grazing agreement with the Grahams.  The reasons for not 
doing so were strategic; they feared it would prejudice a planning application.  The company 
was aware that the Grahams wished to use the land and the company representative who 
visited the land must have noticed that the Grahams were in possession.  It is arguable that 
the company had monitored the land, and was aware and content that it was being exploited 
and maintained while it was seeking planning permission.  The company was simply guilty of 
not acting in an antagonistic or litigious fashion towards a neighbouring farmer.  Can the 
owner really be described as a bad land steward in such circumstances?  
 
A potential role for Leigh v Jack to protect the owner  
 
Before the Grand Chamber decision was delivered in Pye, Buckley argued that the 
application of the rule in Leigh v Jack could prevent a ruling that the Irish law on adverse 
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possession was incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights.
20
 The notion 
of resurrecting the rule in Leigh v Jack to provide more protection for the owner seems 
surprising given that it has been consistently criticised by the judiciary
21
 and the Irish Law 
Reform Commission has twice recommended statutory clarification that it does not apply.
22
  
If more protection is needed for the owner, the application of this rule appears to be an 
inelegant and haphazard method of meeting such a need and I’ll explain why in a minute.  
 
More recently Katz in an article appearing in the McGill Law Journal made a strong plea for 
the reincarnation of the rule in Leigh v Jack which she refers to as an ‘inconsistent use’ model 
of adverse possession.
23
 She feels that the majority of American jurisdictions view the 
transformation of a land thief into a land owner which takes place under the doctrine of 
adverse possession as morally paradoxical. She describes the English model of adverse 
possession as a procedural one which focuses on the extinction of the title of the owner on the 
expiry of the limitation period. It relies on the doctrine of relativity of title to avoid the radical 
transformation of land thief into land owner and so sidesteps the moral paradox faced by 
American jurists. She criticises this approach as relying on an unsatisfactorily weak 
conception of ownership.   
 
She claims that the adoption of an ‘inconsistent use’ model of adverse possession would 
acknowledge the radical transformation of squatters into owners without collapsing into a 
moral paradox. She believes that this approach resolves a number of difficulties. It recognises 
the authority of the owner to set an agenda for the land and to remain the owner without 
maintaining possession. This model of the doctrine fills a vacancy in ownership where the 
owner is no longer exercising his authority and the land has become agenda-less. Where the 
owner has future plans for the land, the uses by the squatter must be inconsistent with that 
future use or agenda in order to challenge the authority of the owner. She draws an analogy 
between the position of the successful adverse possessor and a government which has taken 
over as a result of a bloodless coup d’etat.  She maintains that this model of adverse 
possession ‘solves the moral problems of agenda-less objects just as the recognition of the 
existing government (whatever its origins) solves the moral problem of stateless people.’   
 
Katz proposal would make it more difficult for an adverse possessor to succeed and afford 
more protection to certain owners. However, I have a number of difficulties with it. First, 
trying to establish subjective intention is always difficult and the rule in Leigh v Jack does not 
tell us how specific the owner’s future plans have to be. Also, the inconsistent user test may 
not be as easy to apply as she suggests, particularly in the case of a procrastinating or 
speculating owner.  It is, for example, unclear if the rule would be applied if the owner had a 
number of alternative plans and the squatter’s current use was inconsistent with some of the 
plans but not with others. Also, in the case of a speculating owner, Katz assumes that such an 
owner has no plans or agenda. Surely, his agenda is to sell when the time is right?  In such 
circumstances, it is difficult to see how building on the land could be deemed inconsistent 
with this agenda - he can still fulfil his plans to sell the land, by knocking the building or 
selling the property with the benefit of the building.  This approach seems to overly skew the 
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law in favour of certain owners, while owners with no definite plan or agenda are left 
unprotected.  Her article also pre-supposes ambivalence on the part of English jurists in 
relation to the morality of the doctrine. However, certain judges have been quite vociferous in 
their criticism of the law and, as was highlighted earlier, a very clear moral stance was 
adopted by the Law Commission of England and Wales in the proposals which formed the 
basis for the 2002 reforms.  However, my most fundamental difficulty with her proposal is 
her assumption that the inconsistent user test is the best model for protecting the authority of 
the owner. She fails to discuss the merits of the veto or early warning system of adverse 
possession recently introduced in England.   
 
